Truth and Skepticism

I was sitting in orientation yesterday at Western Michigan, and I encountered what seemed to me to be a very bad position concerning the existence of objective truth. The question of course is "Is there such a thing as objective truth?" At first glance it seems the obvious two choices are either "Yes," or "No." However, the position that troubled me answered our question thus, "I don't know; I suspend belief." We now have three possible answers, but I think only one is correct.

Clearly, answering "No" is absurd. Such skepticism is self-refuting (e.g., is it true that there is no such thing as objective truth?).

What about the third possibility? Does agnosticism really provide a rational answer? No, for two reasons. First, one could point out that the original question only admits of a bivalent answer. Thus, regardless of one's putative ignorace, there are ultimately only two possible answers--"yes" or "no" (per the law of the excluded middle). Second, it seems that such an agnostic position admits (even if not obviously so) to a vicious regress. In answering, "I don't know" it seems plausible that one would very well have the meta-belief that "I believe I don't know if there is objective truth." What of this meta-belief? Does it have a definite truth value? To be consistent the agnostic must answer with continued suspension of belief regarding the truth value of this meta-belief. Thus, the agnostic doesn't know that it's true that she believes that she doesn't know if there is objective truth. Of course, a thrid order meta-meta-belief may be introduced with the same result ad infinitum. The ultimate result is that the agnostic lacks the ability to hold justifed true beliefs (meta-beliefs) about the content of first-order occurent beleifs (i.e., the orginal "I don't know"). This is patently absurd because if I know anything at all, I know whether a meta-beleif concerning a first-order occurrent belief corresponds to the content of that first-order occurrent belief. This third answer fails to satisfy.

We are then left with the original two answers, and I have shown that the negative is necessarily false. Therefore, there must be at least one objective truth. And, allowing one opens the door to a host of others.

Contemporary Christianity and Heresy

All I have is one question, and I am very interested to here your responses.

Why can't the contemporary Evangelical church call those within its ranks who teach false doctrine heretics?

Christianity and Career Goals in the Secular University

I don't know how many of you are familiar with the Leiter Report. Many of you probably know it as the Philosophical Gourmet. Leiter is a philosopher at the University of Texas at Austin. I was discussing the report with another professional philosopher, and came to find out that Leiter is a pretty contankorous fellow---at least according to the philosopher with whom I was speaking. Leiter is devoted atheist, and is passionate about propogating that position. This becomes relevant later.

During the course of our discussion I asked about a comment attributed to Mike Behe but reported by Bill Dembski in the introduction to Uncommon Dissent, "Even if you're not fired from your job, you will easily be passed over for promotions. I would stronly advise graduate students who are skeptical of Darwinian theory not to make their views known" (p. xxxiv). I was wondering if this philosopher would echo Behe's advise. The adivise I was offered was to be the best philosopher I could be, and that when the time came to speak on these issues, I would have something to say, and the platform of respect on which to say it. I thought that was pretty good advice for all of us seeking to be faithful Christian philosophers.

However, Leiter came up. The philosopher with whom I was speaking happens to be a faculty member of a school listed on the Gourmet. Someone speculated that if Leiter knew more about this particular philosopher's positions, e.g., Christian and skeptical of Darwinism, that Leiter might take the school off the list--just for that!

This is serious stuff! One's career can be wrecked merely be being a Christian. This is not new, and it is not the worst that could happen (we could all be martyred, right?). But it does speak to the atmosphere of the secular world of academia. The easy thing to do would be to retreat to serve in only Christian environments. But what of those who need to be influenced by the Christian worldview in the secular environment? It seems reasonable that there is a genuine call by God to some to serve as faithful academics in the secular university. How then is that accomplished? Surely we don't just play the game until we get tenure do we? But at the same time, how do we serve as witnesses against the juggernaut of academia without getting fired?

Kant and the Maniacal Boolean

Here's something I've been pondering lately...

Let's take one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative: treat all subjects as ends, not means. All of us Christians should look at this, and certainly agree, right? We should look at subjects, persons really, and see beings created with dignity in the image of God. Thus, we should treat these persons with the dignity bestowed upon them by their Creator, and treat them as ends in themsleves, never as merely means toward our own ends.

Now, for those of you who are familiar with logic, what would it mean to interpret Kant's imperative from a Boolean perspective? Clearly, Kant's imperative is an A-type categorical, so it's universal. Boolean logic interprets such universals (either A or E type categoricals, e.g., the A, all S are P, or the E, no S are P) as having no existential import. In other words, the categorical proposition implies nothing about the actual existence of the subject term. Further, pretend for a moment that you are a maniacal, power-hungry wacko, that needs to use people as means to get to the top. At the same time you recognize that treating subjects as means is morally reprehensible; in other words, you agree with Kant's categorical imperative. Would it be possible for this maniacal, power-hungry wacko to agree with Kant's categorical imperative, but to interpret it in a Boolean fashion? Would it be possible to say, "Yes, Kant, you are absolutely right! All subjects should be treated as ends, not means. Unfortunately, your categorical impertative is universal, and therefore has not existential import. I deny that there are such real things as subjects (for reasons x, y, and z), and am therefore fully capable (in a moral sense) of using people as the means to get what I really want--power; people are not subjects"?

Shameless Plug

So if anyone still checks this blog.... Go check out the UCONN Graduate Students' new blog:

http://www.tobeablog.com/

I am one of the contributers. We've been advertised on the Leiter report and so we hope to make it into a fairly big time (in the philosophy world anyway) grad-philo blog.

Check it out.

I hope you are all doing well. I'll be sending out an email to the whole DenSem PR gang soon.
Best,
-BJ the Tornado.

2 truth values?

Let X be: "This statement is false."
Then,
Is X true or false?


... or something else?

What is your answer?

I'm here.

And I miss you all. Hope all is well in Colorado. UCONN is a very solid school. I am pleased to say that the classes are incredibly challenging. Particualarly advanced logic. Let me just say that Set Theory is nuts. I don't normally use the terminology I am about to use out of respect for Dr. Lewis's personal gripes... but... Set Theory is blowing my mind. :) And just imagine taking 4 classes each of Obitts difficulty level, WITH required papers, all at the same time. That's what I'm doing right now. ...it's a damn good thing I think this stuff is important. :)

Hey, on another (yet related) note. A friend of mine here in the department just tossed me this "revised" style of ontological argument AGAINST God's existence. I offered a couple early responses. My main objection was that I had a problems with premise 3. I'll list them for you in a bit, but I am curious as to what your objections (if any) would be against the argument -- I am sure there are other places to hit it... where are they?
Thanks guys. Here it is:

1. If God exists, then he is a perfect being.

2. Being perfect entails (instead of existence here) a knock down logical proof of your existence, because, after all, it would be better to have an absolute knock down logical proof of your existence than not, and so, anything that's perfect will have this.

3. There is no knock down logical proof of God's existence (this is evidenced by the fact that there are some reasonable, intellegent people who have thought about it and do not believe in his existence)

4. therefore God does not exist, or he is not perfect.

BJ's PS, my friend mentioned that her point here was not to prove God's nonexistence but to show that arguments of this type (which she thinks the ontological falls under) are really just "slight of hand" style "tricks".

Thanks for any thoughts you have.