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Thursday, July 27

Kant and the Maniacal Boolean

Here's something I've been pondering lately...

Let's take one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative: treat all subjects as ends, not means. All of us Christians should look at this, and certainly agree, right? We should look at subjects, persons really, and see beings created with dignity in the image of God. Thus, we should treat these persons with the dignity bestowed upon them by their Creator, and treat them as ends in themsleves, never as merely means toward our own ends.

Now, for those of you who are familiar with logic, what would it mean to interpret Kant's imperative from a Boolean perspective? Clearly, Kant's imperative is an A-type categorical, so it's universal. Boolean logic interprets such universals (either A or E type categoricals, e.g., the A, all S are P, or the E, no S are P) as having no existential import. In other words, the categorical proposition implies nothing about the actual existence of the subject term. Further, pretend for a moment that you are a maniacal, power-hungry wacko, that needs to use people as means to get to the top. At the same time you recognize that treating subjects as means is morally reprehensible; in other words, you agree with Kant's categorical imperative. Would it be possible for this maniacal, power-hungry wacko to agree with Kant's categorical imperative, but to interpret it in a Boolean fashion? Would it be possible to say, "Yes, Kant, you are absolutely right! All subjects should be treated as ends, not means. Unfortunately, your categorical impertative is universal, and therefore has not existential import. I deny that there are such real things as subjects (for reasons x, y, and z), and am therefore fully capable (in a moral sense) of using people as the means to get what I really want--power; people are not subjects"?

3 Comments:

  • Maybe I'm missing something here, but I believe in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant's actual quote is: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
    Now, it could be possible for this power-hungry wacko to try to wiggle out of anyone being a human person. And in doing so said wacko could morally justify the power-seeking behavior. However, this hypothetical wacko now is in more dubious moral and metaphysical position.

    By Anonymous Anonymous, at 4:03 PM  

  • Chauncey

    First, are we agreed that Kant is issueing a universal categorical, e.g., all x should be treated as y? I would hope we are, since it is called Kant's "categorical" imperative.

    Second, what is Kant actually trying to communicate? Is he saying that all humans should be treated as ends, or that all human persons should be treated as ends? If the latter, then the wacko could deny that there are such things as humans that are persons, while agreeing that if there were such things as human persons, then yes, they should be treated as ends. However, if the former is meant, then you may have me. It would be hard to deny such a thing as human beings as such. If this line were taken, "person" would have to be interpreted to mean body, e.g., the cops searched John, and found LSD on his person, as opposed to something akin to "person" as rational moral agent. But if we take this line, then why does Kant even bother? If humans aren't rational moral agents, then who cares? The wacko gets to do what he wants. (As a side note, I'm not trying to justify the 'Overman' period, only from the Kantian point of view. I'm not hatching some wicked scheme.)

    By Blogger Jeremy, at 9:36 AM  

  • Jeremy, your view is unclear. The Kantian picture of the person is just that humans are by definition rational agents. Your claim that 'A' propositions have "no existential import" is misplaced -- once there is something filling in the antecedent (i.e., a rational agent) then the consequent under the categorical imperative (according to Kant) should follow.

    The problem for something like Kantian ethics is just defining who counts as a rational agent. Do mentally & physically handicapped inviduals count? It's not that the statement doesn't have "existential import"... it's just that it can be difficult to determine who & what counts as "rational."

    By Anonymous Anonymous, at 12:11 PM  

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