2 truth values?

Let X be: "This statement is false."
Then,
Is X true or false?


... or something else?

What is your answer?

I'm here.

And I miss you all. Hope all is well in Colorado. UCONN is a very solid school. I am pleased to say that the classes are incredibly challenging. Particualarly advanced logic. Let me just say that Set Theory is nuts. I don't normally use the terminology I am about to use out of respect for Dr. Lewis's personal gripes... but... Set Theory is blowing my mind. :) And just imagine taking 4 classes each of Obitts difficulty level, WITH required papers, all at the same time. That's what I'm doing right now. ...it's a damn good thing I think this stuff is important. :)

Hey, on another (yet related) note. A friend of mine here in the department just tossed me this "revised" style of ontological argument AGAINST God's existence. I offered a couple early responses. My main objection was that I had a problems with premise 3. I'll list them for you in a bit, but I am curious as to what your objections (if any) would be against the argument -- I am sure there are other places to hit it... where are they?
Thanks guys. Here it is:

1. If God exists, then he is a perfect being.

2. Being perfect entails (instead of existence here) a knock down logical proof of your existence, because, after all, it would be better to have an absolute knock down logical proof of your existence than not, and so, anything that's perfect will have this.

3. There is no knock down logical proof of God's existence (this is evidenced by the fact that there are some reasonable, intellegent people who have thought about it and do not believe in his existence)

4. therefore God does not exist, or he is not perfect.

BJ's PS, my friend mentioned that her point here was not to prove God's nonexistence but to show that arguments of this type (which she thinks the ontological falls under) are really just "slight of hand" style "tricks".

Thanks for any thoughts you have.

Where is everyone?

Just wondering how my fellow Denver Seminary PR students are doing. I am just auditing NT611 (i.e. Greek exegesis of Romans) with Blomberg this semester. This is the closest thing I can manage to taking a semester off.

Since I missed out on Epistemology with Obitts, I read Pojman last month to try to catch up. I still have a lot of questions though. I will try to blog on those when I get a chance. One thing I would like to get your take on is the question of what a proposition is. My thinking is that it is something like a linuistic construct (a declarative sentence) that describes a state of affairs. There is no causal relationship between the proposition and the state of affairs, merely a "descriptive" one (for want of a better term). But does a proposition have ontological status itself? For example, see Moreland and DeWeese's comment:

"conceptual structures that exist independently of anyone's thoughts. ... Further, propositions may be the contents of the thoughts of many different people at different times. Propositions have the property of being true or false. A sentence is true or false derivatively, depending on the truth-value of the proposition that the sentence instantiates. Since the correspondence theory of truth is formulated in terms of propositions, not sentences, arguments such as Kenneson's are simply irrelevant. (Reclaiming the Center, pp. 87-88)

One example of someone taking DRG et al (Carson, Moreland, etc) to task over this is Steve B's blog, which I started reading earlier this year. He is a PhD student at Princeton, and has a posting about DRG's ideas here:

http://harbinger.blogs.com/harbinger/2005/01/on_unicorns_and.html

Now, I think Steve is deliberately trying to be inflammatory and humorous, but reading his blog (esp the comments that it generated) and the
interaction between DRG and Scott McKnight at http://jesuscreed.blogspot.com/2005/07/post-fall-theology.html makes me suspect that someone is missing the point. But who? I just don't want it to be me.