Truth and Skepticism
I was sitting in orientation yesterday at Western Michigan, and I encountered what seemed to me to be a very bad position concerning the existence of objective truth. The question of course is "Is there such a thing as objective truth?" At first glance it seems the obvious two choices are either "Yes," or "No." However, the position that troubled me answered our question thus, "I don't know; I suspend belief." We now have three possible answers, but I think only one is correct.
Clearly, answering "No" is absurd. Such skepticism is self-refuting (e.g., is it true that there is no such thing as objective truth?).
What about the third possibility? Does agnosticism really provide a rational answer? No, for two reasons. First, one could point out that the original question only admits of a bivalent answer. Thus, regardless of one's putative ignorace, there are ultimately only two possible answers--"yes" or "no" (per the law of the excluded middle). Second, it seems that such an agnostic position admits (even if not obviously so) to a vicious regress. In answering, "I don't know" it seems plausible that one would very well have the meta-belief that "I believe I don't know if there is objective truth." What of this meta-belief? Does it have a definite truth value? To be consistent the agnostic must answer with continued suspension of belief regarding the truth value of this meta-belief. Thus, the agnostic doesn't know that it's true that she believes that she doesn't know if there is objective truth. Of course, a thrid order meta-meta-belief may be introduced with the same result ad infinitum. The ultimate result is that the agnostic lacks the ability to hold justifed true beliefs (meta-beliefs) about the content of first-order occurent beleifs (i.e., the orginal "I don't know"). This is patently absurd because if I know anything at all, I know whether a meta-beleif concerning a first-order occurrent belief corresponds to the content of that first-order occurrent belief. This third answer fails to satisfy.
We are then left with the original two answers, and I have shown that the negative is necessarily false. Therefore, there must be at least one objective truth. And, allowing one opens the door to a host of others.
Clearly, answering "No" is absurd. Such skepticism is self-refuting (e.g., is it true that there is no such thing as objective truth?).
What about the third possibility? Does agnosticism really provide a rational answer? No, for two reasons. First, one could point out that the original question only admits of a bivalent answer. Thus, regardless of one's putative ignorace, there are ultimately only two possible answers--"yes" or "no" (per the law of the excluded middle). Second, it seems that such an agnostic position admits (even if not obviously so) to a vicious regress. In answering, "I don't know" it seems plausible that one would very well have the meta-belief that "I believe I don't know if there is objective truth." What of this meta-belief? Does it have a definite truth value? To be consistent the agnostic must answer with continued suspension of belief regarding the truth value of this meta-belief. Thus, the agnostic doesn't know that it's true that she believes that she doesn't know if there is objective truth. Of course, a thrid order meta-meta-belief may be introduced with the same result ad infinitum. The ultimate result is that the agnostic lacks the ability to hold justifed true beliefs (meta-beliefs) about the content of first-order occurent beleifs (i.e., the orginal "I don't know"). This is patently absurd because if I know anything at all, I know whether a meta-beleif concerning a first-order occurrent belief corresponds to the content of that first-order occurrent belief. This third answer fails to satisfy.
We are then left with the original two answers, and I have shown that the negative is necessarily false. Therefore, there must be at least one objective truth. And, allowing one opens the door to a host of others.
posted by Jeremy at
2:28:00 PM
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