OK, one more round of the Zoink... sorry -- I'm tired of him too.
Alright, Ian you are telling me that the Zoink counter example doesn't work b/c there cannot be two necessary beings. There can only be one necessary being -- and that's the point. But hold on a second... why do we even concieve of God as necessary in the first place?
Here's where I think Geisler is right (You guys know me... I "like" Geisler) -- the Ontological arg. used as you are doing only works because of the conception of God as the only necessary non-contingent being. Well, quite frankly, the only way we think or conceive of God in this light is AFTER we have learned (or, if you're really smart, thought up) the Cosmological argument for a necessary being (you know: cause - effect, cause - effect, etc... all the way back -- if there is a present there had to be a first cause AKA Kalam).
So, if we don't know the cosmological arguments FIRST then our conception of God wouldn't include him being a necessary being (it also wouldn't include him being contingent -- our conceptions of things just wouldn't think in those terms). If this is the case, and I think clearly it is, then the ontological argument is simply something we deduce after the establishment of the cosmological argument. Since it is entirely dependent upon the cosmo. arg, it may "work", but really -- is it saying anything that the cosmo doesn't? Namely that God is a necessary non-contingent being; the unmoved mover.
Is there any way to rescue the Ontological argument from its dependence upon the cosmo arg? I think not. Unless you were to argue that we conceive of God as a necessary being without arriving at that conclusion based upon some sort of thinking about cause/effect, etc. For example, I think we do conceive of God as omnipotent (and other attributes), by the very def. of God. But we don't even think in TERMS of necessary or contingent (and therefore would not conceive of God as either necessary nor contingent) until we play out the cause/effect situation of reality and come to realize that there must be a necessary non-contingent who started everything.
What say you?
-Tornado.
Here's where I think Geisler is right (You guys know me... I "like" Geisler) -- the Ontological arg. used as you are doing only works because of the conception of God as the only necessary non-contingent being. Well, quite frankly, the only way we think or conceive of God in this light is AFTER we have learned (or, if you're really smart, thought up) the Cosmological argument for a necessary being (you know: cause - effect, cause - effect, etc... all the way back -- if there is a present there had to be a first cause AKA Kalam).
So, if we don't know the cosmological arguments FIRST then our conception of God wouldn't include him being a necessary being (it also wouldn't include him being contingent -- our conceptions of things just wouldn't think in those terms). If this is the case, and I think clearly it is, then the ontological argument is simply something we deduce after the establishment of the cosmological argument. Since it is entirely dependent upon the cosmo. arg, it may "work", but really -- is it saying anything that the cosmo doesn't? Namely that God is a necessary non-contingent being; the unmoved mover.
Is there any way to rescue the Ontological argument from its dependence upon the cosmo arg? I think not. Unless you were to argue that we conceive of God as a necessary being without arriving at that conclusion based upon some sort of thinking about cause/effect, etc. For example, I think we do conceive of God as omnipotent (and other attributes), by the very def. of God. But we don't even think in TERMS of necessary or contingent (and therefore would not conceive of God as either necessary nor contingent) until we play out the cause/effect situation of reality and come to realize that there must be a necessary non-contingent who started everything.
What say you?
-Tornado.
posted by BJS at
10:54:00 AM
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